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ABSTRACT: Focusing on Greece, this essay aims to contribute to a philosophical understanding 
of Europe’s current financial crisis and, more generally, of the aporetic implications of the 
modern determination of freedom as such. One the one hand, I draw on Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right in order to argue that modernity entails a potential conflict between a market economy 
and a state that is supposed to further the interests of the society as a whole. On the other hand, 
I draw on Sophocles’ Oedipus the King as well as on Hegel’s account of tragedy in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit to reinterpret the conflict between the spheres of civil society and the state as a tragic 
conflict. Modernity threatens to undermine itself from within, I maintain, because the 
simultaneous development of capitalism and democracy makes it very hard to prevent the 
sphere of particular interests from encroaching upon the sphere of politics.  
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For some years now, the world is being flooded with a financial crisis the successive 
waves of which seem ever more difficult to contain. At the heart of this crisis is the 
necessity – within a capitalist economy – of constant economic growth and the view 
that this growth is best realized by letting the market operate as freely as possible. By 
unleashing this freedom, however, recent and current governments have allowed 
investors to generate profits in ways that contributed ever less to actual economic 
growth, let alone to the flourishing of the society as a whole. Today we see politicians 
desperately trying to ward off the attacks of creditors on national budgets and, with 
regard to the financial world as a whole, fighting what Hegel once called a “wild beast” 
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requiring “strict dominance and taming”.1 At this point it is difficult to tell what will be 
the long-term impact of the current crises on Europe, the US, and the world as a 
whole. Yet it seems to me that this crisis calls for reflection not just on its causes, but 
also – in the case of philosophy – on the logic at work in the events that led up to the 
situation in which we find ourselves today.  
In the hope to contribute to such a reflection, the present essay focuses on the 
current crisis of Greece, which I take to expose features that no less characterize the 
situation of other European countries, Europe, and the US. Looking at Greece, we are 
faced with a truth that concerns all of us and is extremely hard to bear. Accounts of the 
recent history of Greece – starting with its entering the euro zone in 2001 – are likely to 
refer to the tragic blindness of the individuals and institutions involved as well as to the 
tragic character of the events that threaten to result in the bankruptcy of the state and 
perhaps even in the end of the euro. The lot of Greece can also be called tragic because 
of the many citizens that are faced with unemployment, the closure of their shops, huge 
debts, and an increasing insecurity as to their own future, that of their children, and of 
the society as a whole.  
Yet this essay is not concerned with these concrete forms of human suffering. It 
rather aims to understand the current financial crisis from a vantage point that differs 
from both liberal political theory and Marxism, not in the least by shedding the 
optimism inherent in these positions. An alternative way of reflecting on the dynamic of 
historical events – one that has repeatedly been employed in modern philosophy – 
originated in Greek culture itself. Responding to the crisis caused by its modernization 
during the fifth century, classical Greek culture produced tragedies that aimed to grasp 
the nature of the conflict that was undermining the society from within. Hegel, drawing 
on the insights articulated in Greek tragedy, can be said to have transformed its core 
elements into a conceptual tool that informs not just his account of Greek culture in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, but his philosophy as a whole. In what follows I will draw on a 
modified version of Hegel’s conception of tragedy in order to reflect on Greece’s 
financial crisis – and hence on the aporetic implications of the modern determination of 
freedom as such.  
 Apart from his account of tragedy, Hegel’s philosophy is also relevant to the 
present essay because he was one of the first intellectuals to address the enormous 
challenges that a market economy poses to states that are supposed to further the 
interests of the society as a whole. For this reason I will also discuss the section of his 
1 G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Systementwürfe I: Das System der Spekulativen Philosophie, edited by K. Düsing and H. 
Kimmerle (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1986), 230, partly translated by H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox as 
‘Hegel’s First Philosophy of Spirit’ in System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (Albany: 
SUNY Press 1979), 249, translation modified.  
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Philosophy of Right that deals with the potential conflict between the complementary 
spheres of economics and politics. As I see it, this analysis is only one step away from an 
interpretation of that conflict as a tragic conflict. This is precisely the step that I hope to 
take in what follows. However, this step requires a few preparatory moves. Let me set 
the scene by briefly recalling the story exposed in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King.   
1. OEDIPUS THE KING 
Oedipus’ tormented life is defined by a twice-repeated oracle. According to the first 
oracle of Phoebus he was doomed to kill his father and marry his mother – hence his 
expulsion from Thebes as a newborn baby. Having been adopted by the king and 
queen of Corinth, he at some point begins to doubt about his lineage. In order to 
discover the truth he consults the priests of Phoebus. Instead of telling him who his real 
parents are, the oracle tells him that he is doomed to kill his father and marry his 
mother. Fleeing his foster parents in order to prevent that from happening, he 
unknowingly meets his real father on the road and kills him. Upon arriving in Thebes 
some time later, he frees the city from the Sphinx that had terrorized the city by 
devouring those who failed to solve its riddle. Thebes rewards Oedipus by making him 
king and letting him marry the recently widowed queen Jocaste – which means the 
fulfillment of the second part of the oracle. Many years later, the unpunished murder 
and incest committed by Oedipus infect the city with a pollution that plunges it into a 
crisis much deeper than the first, a crisis that a priest describes to Oedipus as follows: 
 
King, you yourself  
have seen our city reeling like a wreck 
already: it can scarcely lift its prow out of the depths, out of the bloody surf. 
A blight is on the fruitful plants of the earth, 
A blight is on the cattle in the fields,  
A blight is on our women that no children  
are born to them; a God that carries fire, 
a deadly pestilence, is on our town, 
strikes us and spares not, and the house of Cadmus 
is emptied of its people while black Death 
grows rich in groaning and in lamentation.2 
 
According to a third oracle from Phoebus, Thebes can only be saved by driving out “a 
pollution grown ingrained within the land, . . . not cherish it till it is past cure”,3 which 
2 Sophocles, ‘Oedipus the King’, in: D. Grene and R. Lattimore, The Complete Greek Tragedies, Vol. II, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1959), v. 22-30. 
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means more concretely that the murderer of Laios must be found and expelled from 
the city. The actual play then shows us how Oedipus tries to discover the cause of the 
pollution and finally realizes that all traces lead to himself. No one is to blame for 
Thebes’ second crisis except the man whose first act consisted in liberating the city 
from an archaic form of terror (the Sphinx) and hence allowed Thebes to prosper for 
many years.  
Now it seems to me that at least three elements of the play point to insights that do 
not just concern the story of Oedipus life, or Greek culture, but human life as such. 
Firstly, Sophocles’ play deals with a pollution that is caused from within rather than 
from without: although Oedipus appears to be a stranger to Thebes, it turns out that he 
is the son of the former king and queen. Secondly, if we assume that oracles cannot be 
overruled, it was unavoidable that Thebes be plagued by the pollution caused by 
Oedipus’ deeds. Moreover, the play makes it clear that the second crisis of Thebes 
results from the very same cause as its earlier flourishing, that is, from the arrival of 
Oedipus. Thus, that which initially saved Thebes is at the same time that which 
threatens to destroy it. This is also true of Oedipus himself. Out of pity, a shepherd 
saved his life as a baby, thereby making possible the disastrous fulfilment of the oracle. 
As the seer Teiresias tells him: “It is this very luck that has destroyed you”.4 Thirdly, 
the play illustrates how human beings tend to ignore or deny the self-undermining 
dynamic exemplified by the fate of Thebes. They can hardly bear to see the truth or, if 
they do, prefer not to speak their mind for fear of repercussions. The only person who 
recognizes the murderer in the new king of Thebes is the servant of Laios, who survived 
the murdering of his master and became a shepherd again – the same shepherd that 
originally saved Oedipus when he was a baby. Yet he remains silent and initially refuses 
to speak even when cross-examined by Oedipus.5 Oedipus, for his part, repeatedly 
refuses to take seriously any information that might endanger his own position. Not just 
in Greek culture, there is an inherent tendency to silence critics or messengers of bad 
news.  
Oedipus finally realizes the true meaning of the events that mark his life and that of 
Thebes. He realizes that he himself has caused not just the prosperity of Thebes, but 
also the contagious plague that threatens to destroy it. With regard to the current 
sovereign debt crisis in Greece, a plague that is no less contagious, commentators have 
begun to voice a similar insight in books, newspapers, and other media. Yet the 
response of more conservative commentators and politicians is more similar to the stage 
3 Ibid., v. 96-97. 
4 Ibid., v. 442. 
5 Ibid., v. 759, 1146. 
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of denial that Oedipus went through. In their view, the crisis is caused by a number of 
contingent elements. If one or more of these elements had not been in place, Greece 
and Europe would not have been in trouble. They might be right. Yet in order to 
approach the current crisis from a philosophical point of view, one has to assume that 
the recent history of Greece, Europe, and the modern world at large testifies to a 
certain necessity or to a certain logic. On the other hand, any account of this history 
remains empty unless it draws on given material. That is why the next section considers 
a few facts about contemporary Greece. 
2. GREECE 
Much of what I discuss in this section is derived from Jason Manopoulos’ illuminative 
Greece’s Odious Debt: The Looting of the Hellenic Republic by the Euro, the Political Elite and the 
Investment Community, published in 2011.6 Between 1453 and 1821 Greece was occupied 
by the Ottoman Empire. During this time, people were obliged to pay high taxes to the 
Ottoman rulers and tried hard to avoid doing so.7 After its independence Greece 
became a monarchy, but behind the screens Great Britain and the US came to exert a 
huge influence on national politics. While the political system was formally democratic, 
it was actually bound up with a pre-modern, clan-based system of relations based on 
extending and receiving favors – the clientelism that marks Greek politics until today 
and is the cause of high levels of corruption and political and economical stagnation. 
After the second world war Greece tried to defeat the Communists, who were 
supported by large parts of the population. This resulted in four years of civil war and, 
between 1967 and 1974, in a period of military dictatorship. Despite efforts to eradicate 
it, Communism remained a popular movement, and to this day Communist trade 
unions have retained more power in Greece than elsewhere.  
Given the fact that Greece has been ruled by foreign powers or dictators for such a 
long time, it is quite understandable that many citizens are not inclined to identify with 
their nation state and do not feel obliged to obey its laws or further its ends. Elected 
politicians, for their part, know that they can only survive as long as they extend favors 
6 J. Manopoulos, Greece’s Odious Debt: The Looting of the Hellenic Republic by the Euro, the Political Elite and the 
Investment Community (London and New York: Anthem Press 2011). Similar accounts are offered by M. Lynn 
in Bust: Greece, the Euro and the Sovereign Debt Crisis (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2011) and 
by M. Mitsopoulos and T. Pelagidis in Understanding the Crisis in Greece: From Boom to Bust (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2012). While Lynn’s detailed reconstruction approaches the events resulting in 
Greece’s current crisis from the perspective of Europe as a whole, Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis focus on the 
internal weaknesses of Greece’s economic and political systems. See also ‘Eine Bombenidee’, Der Spiegel 
39, 26-9-2011, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-80652382.html. 
7 Manopoulos, Greece’s Odious Debt, 64. 
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to particular groups of voters, whether the rich or people from their own region or 
village. Evidently, this clientelism produces even more skepticism among the citizens as 
to the impartiality of their politicians or the rationality of its institutions, a vicious circle 
that is hard to breach. Purporting that its public deficit was much lower than it actually 
was, Greece entered into the euro zone in 2001. Other elements that spoke against the 
entry of Greece were its high level of corruption and its disproportionally large military 
budget. Because of its ongoing conflict with Turkey, Greece spent and continues to 
spend huge sums on German weapons as well as on French frigates and military 
aircraft.8 For these and other reasons, a number of critical economists advised against 
including Greece in the euro zone or even against introducing the euro at that point in 
time at all. Yet most politicians, like Oedipus, ignored these warnings. They wanted to 
include Greece in order to create a common market as large as possible, so as to allow 
German, French, and other European companies to sell weapons, frigates and coffee 
machines to the Greeks and, on the other hand, to allow their national and commercial 
banks to lend them the money they needed to buy these and other products. As 
Manopoulos puts it,  
Brussels knew about the misleading figures. It was in the EU’s short-term interest 
to let the pattern of borrowing and spending continue. This involved German and 
French banks lending to the Greek government, . . . European banks lending to 
construction firms and mortgage lenders, and the international bonds market 
lending to peripheral governments.9  
For reasons already mentioned, much of the funds that came available after 2001 and 
of the money lent by European banks went down the drain. Its membership of the EU, 
Manopoulos writes, 
enabled Greece, as a poorer country, to avail itself of generous EU development 
funds, and later cheap borrowing through membership of the single currency. 
From the 1980s onwards, . . . buying social peace . . . began in earnest. This 
continued and morphed into a positive orgy of borrowing and spending after the 
entry into the euro of 2001. If all the largesse had been spent on welfare, education 
and infrastructure, the effects might not have been so damaging. Unfortunately, a 
disproportionally high amount . . . has gone on military hardware, administrative 
waste, corruption and sham jobs dished out to party supporters. The public sector 
only grew in inefficiency, bureaucracy and overstaffing and the government 
effectively became subordinate to the parties rather than to the nation. The 
8 Ibid., 71-75. 
9 Ibid., 154, cf. 72. 
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populist path was followed almost entirely by all governments from 1981 
onwards.10 
If we abstract from issues such as misleading financial data, a disproportional military 
budget, cheap credit and a recession caused by an earlier wave of the financial crisis, 
what we see is a government and a set of institutions too weak to raise above the sphere 
of particular interests. Under such conditions, citizens, politicians and investors are 
likely to perceive the state as a means to further their own interests rather than as an 
institution devoted to the long-term flourishing of the society as a whole. Politicians will 
tend to try to win votes by creating more public sector jobs, increasing pensions, 
opposing tax reforms, etc. At the same time, they are likely to preclude reforms of 
economic regulations intended to let the private sector flourish, because that would 
reduce their direct influence on potential voters. Since many citizens, in their turn, 
personally profit from the status quo, efforts to decrease the deficit or implement 
reforms are not widely supported by the public either.11 What was and is lacking, in 
short, is a clear-cut distinction between the sphere of politics and the sphere of civil 
society. Manopoulos refers to this as follows: 
The codependence of short-termist investors and short-termist governments is a 
seriously destabilising relationship. When we see them erupt with rage at each 
other, we see something akin to self-loathing.12 
If we take a bit more distance, what we might also see is an utterly disturbing 
entanglement of the spheres of civil society and the state. In this respect, the Greek 
situation mirrors that of the US and, to a lesser extent, European countries as well as 
Europe as a whole. According to Hegel, a modern state can only be rational if it does 
not let the sphere of civil society encroach upon itself, but uses the economic activity 
carried out within this sphere as a means to further the interests of the society as a 
whole. Yet what is rational may well be very difficult to achieve in actual modern 
societies, as Hegel would be the first to admit.  
3. HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
The idea of the modern state that Hegel exposes in the Philosophy of Right is based on the 
insight that the human being as such is free and that states should be organized in 
10 Ibid., 78-79. 
11 See Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, Understanding the Crisis in Greece, 6-23. 
12 Manopoulos, Greece’s Odious Debt, 177.  
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accordance with this principle.13 This principle entails, on the one hand, the 
overcoming of feudalism and, on the other hand, the unavoidable rise of an economic 
sphere based on the principles of a free market. The Philosophy of Right responds to both 
of these developments. Within feudalist systems, the nobility possessed not just 
domains, but also the peasants and serfs who worked for them. Similarly, a feudal king 
could conceive of his country and its inhabitants as his private property. Seen in this 
light, it makes perfect sense to maintain, as Hegel does, that a modern state can only be 
rational if the government does not represent particular interests opposed to other 
particular interests, but acts on the basis of universal laws and principles: 
The state, conceived as the actuality of the substantial will, an actuality which it 
possesses when its particular consciousness of itself has been raised to universality, 
is the rational in and for itself. This substantial unity is an absolute and unmoved 
end in itself, and in it, freedom obtains its highest right, just as this ultimate end 
possesses the highest right in relation to the individuals, whose highest duty it is to 
be members of the state.14 
Passages such as these have often been considered to illustrate Hegel’s alleged 
totalitarianism.15 Yet they might as well be regarded as a critique of the power formerly 
granted to monarchs and the nobility, for the freedom that Hegel attributes to the state 
consists in its capacity to abstract completely from particular interests.16 Citizens, for 
13 G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, edited by E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1986), translated by H.B. Nisbet as Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), § 273, add. (hereafter abbreviated as PR). 
14 PR, § 258, cf. § 260. 
15 See K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Ennemies, Vol. II: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and the 
Aftermath, 5th ed. 1966 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 27-80. Interestingly, Marx’s early critique of 
Hegel is almost indistinguishable from a critique based on a liberal position: “The idea is made into a 
subject and the actual relationship of family and civil society to the state is conceived to be its inner 
imaginary activity. Family and civil society are the presuppositions of the state; they are what is really 
active; but in speculative philosophy it is reversed. But if the idea is made subject, then the actual subjects – 
civil society, family . . . , etc., become unreal.” K. Marx, ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ (1843), 
in: Early Political Writings, translated by J. O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), 2. 
Hegel, he writes a few pages later, “starts from the state and makes man into the subjectified state; 
democracy starts with man and makes the state an objectified man. Just as it is not religion that creates 
man but man who creates religion, so it is not the constution that creates the people but the people which 
creates the constitution.” (Ibid., 9). Marx’ position seems to differ from liberal political theory only by 
assuming that human beings are capable of acting regardless of their immediate self-interest. In my view, 
Marx was much more naive than Hegel as to the capacity of a modern society to flourish without a market 
economy and a strong state. I will argue, however, that Hegel, for his part, was too optimistic as to the 
capacity of modern societies to preserve the hierachical relation between state and market, a relation that 
he rightly considered to be a necessary condition for such flourishing. 
16 “The particular functions and activities of the state belong to it as its own essential moments, and the 
individuals who perform and implement them are associated with them . . . only by virtue of their universal 
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their part, should have access to the law and, while pursuing their particular ends, 
should comply with the law, pay their taxes, and defend their country in times of war.17 
Thus, for Hegel the idea of a modern state entails on the other hand that citizens – 
rather than the king – should be free to pursue their proper ends. Yet he assigns this 
principle not to the sphere of politics, but to the sphere of civil society. Hegel’s analysis 
of civil society is an attempt to account for the necessity of a modern market economy 
in purely philosophical terms. Contrary to the family and the state, the sphere of civil 
society is characterized by the opposition between self-interested citizens and 
institutions that allow them to transcend these interests in limited ways.18 In line with 
Adam Smith, Hegel stresses that modern forms of production and trade bring about a 
complex network on which individuals depend for their own means of subsistence. By 
producing, selling and buying goods, they unknowingly produce  
 
a system of all-encompassing dependence, so that the subsistence, welfare, and 
rights of the individual . . . are interwoven with, and grounded on, the subsistence, 
welfare, and rights of all, and have actuality and security only in this context.19 
More than in Hegel’s days, today this is true not only of the relation between 
individuals or companies, but also of the relation between states throughout the world. 
and objective qualities. . . . For this reason, the functions and the powers of the state cannot be private 
property.” (PR, § 277). Contrary to some recent commentators, I do not think that the mode of freedom 
that Hegel attributes to the state itself can be interpreted as a form of ‘social freedom’ achieved by the 
citizens of a nation state. This line of thought has been introduced by F. Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s 
Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000). Honneth’s and Pippin’s 
accounts of Hegel’s political philosophy likewise take their bearings from the notion of individual freedom 
and the intersubjective conditions that have to be met to realize the latter. This entails, in my view, that 
they cannot bring into focus Hegel’s systematic understanding of the potential conflict between the various 
spheres of modern societies, in particular that between the economic and the political spheres. See A. 
Honneth, The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Thought, translated by L. Löb (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010) and R. Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical 
Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008). 
17 “The essence of the modern state consists in uniting the universal with the full freedom of particularity 
and the well-being of the individuals. It requires, that is, that the interests of the family and civil society 
converge toward the state, but equally that the universality of the end cannot advance without the form of 
knowing and willing that belongs to particularity. . . . Only when both moments attain force and preserve 
this force can the state be regarded as articulate and truly organized.” (PR, § 260 add.) 
18 “Divided in this way, the idea gives a distinct existence to its moments – to particularity it gives the right 
to develop and let itself go in all directions, and to universality the right to prove itself both as the ground 
and necessary form of particularity, and as the power behind it and its ultimate end.” (PR, § 184, 
translation modified). In what follows I will question Hegel’s assumption that the moment of universality is 
necessarily capable of establishing itself as the power and ultimate end of the moment of particularity, but 
retain his view that the two complementary sides necessarily become opposed to one another. 
19 PR, § 183. 
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Yet it would be mistaken to present Hegel’s account of civil society as a straightforward 
defense of a market economy, for he does not share the optimism inherent in accounts 
such as Smith’s. According to Hegel, a capitalist economy left to its own devices 
produces misery and ethical corruption rather than welfare and stability, as emerges 
from the following passages:  
In these opposites and their entanglement, civil society affords a spectacle of 
extravagance and misery as well as of the physical and ethical corruption common 
to both.20 
The tendency of the social condition towards an indeterminate multiplication and 
specification of needs, means, and pleasures – that is, luxury - . . . involves an 
equally infinite increase in dependence and want.21 
It thus emerges that civil society, despite an excess of wealth, is not wealthy 
enough, that is, its own distinct resources are not sufficient to control the excess of 
poverty and the formation of a rabble.22 
I take Hegel to be arguing here that a modern society cannot flourish without a market 
economy, but that the latter at the same time threatens to destroy the stability of the 
society as a whole. Therefore the Philosophy of Right maintains that modern societies 
must possess strong institutions if they are to rein in the forces unleashed by the 
conception of freedom on which this economy is based.  
Even though corporations were being abolished in Prussia and elsewhere at the 
time that he wrote his Philosophy of Right, Hegel believed that they ought to continue to 
play a crucial role in the modern world. According to the system with which he was 
familiar, corporations promoted the interests of those who shared the same profession, 
regulated the price of goods and services, decided how many were allowed to enter the 
profession, and looked after those of its members and their families who were unable to 
provide for themselves.23 At the same time they offered members a way of identifying 
with a more general aim than their immediate self-interest.24 Seen from a subjective 
20 PR, § 185, cf. §§ 241-245. 
21 PR, § 195. 
22 PR, § 245. See S. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1972), 147-154, T. E. Wartenberg, ‘Poverty and Class Structure in Hegel’s Theory of Civil Society’, in 
Philosophy and Social Criticism 8, 1981, 169-182. 
23 PR, § 252. The system of corporations as Hegel knew it developed out of the medieval system of guilds. 
Obviously, it has very little in common with today’s multinational corporations. See G. Heiman, ‘The 
Sources and Significance of Hegel’s Corporate Doctrine’, in: Z.A. Pelczinski, (ed.), Hegel’s Political 
Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1971), 111-135. 
24 PR, §§ 253-255. 
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standpoint, a market economy threatens to reduce individuals to atomistic entities that 
act exclusively in order to further their particular interests:  
If the individual is not a member of a legally recognized corporation . . . his 
isolation reduces him to the selfish aspect of his trade, and his livelihood and 
satisfaction lack stability. He will accordingly try to gain recognition through the 
external manifestations of success in his trade, and these are without limit because 
it is impossible for him to live in a way appropriate to his estate if his estate does 
not exist.25  
Yet this is not the only perspective on the corporation that Hegel adopts. In line with 
the Philosophy of Right as a whole, he also considers the role of the corporations from an 
objective point of view, which means, in this case, that he considers the state itself to 
require corporations in order to preserve its rational character and that of the society as 
a whole.26 According to Hegel, corporations are vital because they provide the state 
with the means to prevent the market from gaining the upper hand, something that 
would reduce citizens to their roles of producers and consumers. In his view, only a 
state that achieves this aim can be called truly free.  
However, Hegel was well aware that the corporations such as they existed in his 
time had increasingly identified with the particular interests of their members. That is 
why he argues that the state should ultimately prevent the corporations from positing 
themselves as ends in themselves:  
The task of treating these particular rights [of the corporations] as rights that are 
in the interest of the state and the legal sphere, and that of subordinating these 
rights to the universal interest of the state, need to be performed by delegates of 
the executive power, that is, by executive civil servants and higher consultative 
bodies . . . that converge in the supreme positions of those who fall directly under 
the monarch.27  
According to Hegel, a state can only establish itself as rational if it possesses the means 
to control the disruptive dynamic proper to civil society, something that under modern 
conditions threatens to become more and more difficult. In other words, the condition 
of a market economy – which Hegel endorses – requires not only that the state produce 
strong civic institutions, but also that it possesses the political force to control these 
institutions themselves.  
25 PR, § 253, cf. § 255, add. 
26 “These institutions together form the constitution – that is, developed and actualized rationality – in the 
realm of particularity, and they are therefore the firm foundation of the state and of the trust and 
disposition of the individuals towards it. They are the pillars on which public freedom rests, for it is within 
them that particular freedom is realized and rational.” (PR, § 265, cf. § 262). 
27 PR, § 289, translation modified, cf. § 289, rem.  
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Evidently, this view of the state cannot be articulated from the perspective of liberal 
political theory. Contrary to the tradition initiated by Hobbes and Locke, Hegel does 
not primarily conceive of the state as a means to further the particular ends of 
individual citizens, even though the latter may have very good reasons to treat the state 
in this way. Accordingly, he does not think that philosophy should adopt the freedom of 
the individual as its ultimate principle, because this freedom tends to be defined in 
terms that are appropriate only with regard to the sphere of civil society, namely, as the 
freedom to pursue one’s particular interests as long as they do not conflict with those of 
others: 
If the state is confused with civil society and its determination is equated with the 
security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of 
individuals as such becomes the ultimate end for which they are united; it also 
follows from this that membership of the state is an optional matter. – But the 
relationship of the state to the individual is of a quite different kind. . . . [T]he 
destiny of individuals is to lead a universal life; their further particular satisfaction, 
activity, and mode of conduct have this substantial and universally valid basis as 
their point of departure and result.28  
As I see it, Hegel’s reason to attribute a certain kind of freedom to the state as such is a 
critical response to the threat posed by the kind of freedom constitutive of a market 
economy. He may well have been naive in thinking that a modernized system of 
corporations could have thwarted the destabilizing effects of a market economy. Yet it 
seems to me that the Philosophy of Right offers an insight into the tension inherent in the 
modern world that has not lost its pertinence. 
4. THE TRAGIC ENTANGLEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE 
I take Hegel to argue that within modern societies the relation between state and civil 
society necessarily turns into a conflict, because the state must prevent the force 
unleashed by the principle of self-interest from encroaching upon the civic and political 
institutions intended to further the interests of the society as a whole. Given his remarks 
on the corrupting effects of a market economy as well as his view that corporations do 
not necessarily comply with the purpose of the state, Hegel appears to have realized 
that actual states may not be able to achieve this aim. Clearly, the Philosophy of Right 
does not interpret the conflict between civil society and the state as a tragic conflict.29 
Yet it seems to me that Hegel’s remarks on this subject might well be reinterpreted in 
light of the conception of tragic conflicts that he elaborates in the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
28 PR, § 258, rem. 
29 The argument that follows draws on my On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative (Palgrave Macmillan 2010).  
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In the chapter of this work devoted to ethical life Hegel maintains that tragic 
conflicts emerge whenever a hero mistakes one side of the whole for the whole itself. 
This view is also brought out by the one passage in which he refers to Oedipus the King:  
Reality therefore hides the other side, the side that is foreign to knowing, and does 
not expose itself to consciousness as it is in and for itself – it does not expose to the 
son the father in the man who offends him and whom he kills, and neither the 
mother in the queen that he takes as his wife.30  
Oedipus’ fate is tragic because he could not see that the father he was fleeing and the 
man whom he murdered were but two different guises of the same person, as was the 
case with the mother he was fleeing and the woman he married. In other words, he did 
not realize that the law he knowingly followed 
is in the essence tied to its opposite; the essence is the unity of both; but the deed 
has only carried out one law in contrast to the other.31 
With regard to Sophocles’s Antigone Hegel likewise argues that the tragic conflict 
between Antigone and Creon unfolded because they both identified with ethical 
paradigms that were but one-sided determinations of the good as such. Such contrary 
determinations necessarily clash, for each side will attempt to establish itself as the 
ultimate principle of itself and its opposite. This clash is tragic, on Hegel’s account, if 
neither side is necessarily able to reduce its counterpart to a subordinate moment: 
The victory of one power and its character, and the defeat of the other side, would 
thus be only the part and the incomplete work, a work that advances relentlessly 
toward the equilibrium of both. Only in the subjugation of both sides alike is 
absolute right accomplished and has the ethical substance manifested itself as the 
negative power that absorbs both sides.32  
Clearly, heroes such as Antigone, Creon and Oedipus could only achieve insight into 
the unity underlying their one-sided conceptions of the good – if at all – after their 
tragic downfall. Because they did not realize the one-sidedness of their own conception 
of the real or the good, their attempt to act in accordance with this conception 
necessarily becomes opposed to its opposite and results into their downfall. It is this self-
undermining dynamic that, in my view, informs the Antigone, Oedipus the King and many 
other classical tragedies. Whereas it often comes about through the interaction between 
30 G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, edited by H.-F. Wessels and H. Clairmont (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag 1988), 309, translated by A.V. Miller as Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1977), 283 (hereafter abbreviated as Phen). 
31 Phen 309/283, translation modified, cf. 482/446. 
32 Phen 311/285, translation modified.  
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two protagonists, this is not necessarily so. Neither is this dynamic dependent on the 
question as to whether a tragic plot culminates in some kind of reconciliation.  
Insofar as Hegel refers to actual tragedies, he is extremely vague as to the way in 
which the contrary moments of a certain principle can be reconciled. For the present 
purpose we can disregard the fact that his speculative method presupposes a certain 
optimism as to the outcome of conflicts. What I propose to take over from Hegel is his 
view that tragic conflicts unfold whenever contrary determinations of a single principle 
seek to posit themselves as the whole principle, but neither is necessarily strong enough 
to reduce its counterpart to a subordinate moment of itself.  
If we now return to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, it might be argued that in modern 
societies the sphere of civil society and the sphere of the state are based on contrary 
determinations of the principle of freedom. Whereas civil society – and a market 
economy – relies on freedom conceived in terms of self-interest, the state conceives of 
freedom as the capacity of both the government and those who are being governed to 
act on the basis of rational principles and laws. Since self-interest is always a particular 
interest, these contrary determinations can be said to exemplify the logical relation 
between particularity and universality. Attempting to posit themselves as the whole, 
both sides necessarily become opposed to one another. Yet if these determinations are 
entangled to such an extent that neither is necessarily strong enough to subject its 
counterpart to its proper end, then there is no guarantee whatsoever that the sphere of 
the state will have the force to posit itself as the ultimate principle of the society as a 
whole and reduce its other – the market – to a moment of its proper self-actualization. 
The market might as well succeed in reducing the state to a means through which it 
can achieve its proper end. In other words, the determination of freedom that allowed 
societies to vanquish feudalism – that is, freedom conceived as individual self-interest – 
is at the same time the determination of freedom that threatens to corrupt the 
determination of freedom represented by the state.  
Seen in this way, the recent history of Greece is not tragic because of the suffering 
caused by its sovereign debt crisis, but rather because of the incapacity of its successive 
governments to disentangle the sphere of the state from the sphere of civil society and 
posit the former as the ultimate principle of both. On this account, this failure is not 
accidental, but testifies to the tragic nature of the conflict that necessarily unfolds 
between the contrary determinations of freedom constitutive of modern societies. This 
can be made more concrete by considering that modernity entails not just capitalism, 
but also democracy. 
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6. THE TRAGEDY OF MODERNITY 
While drawing attention to its corrupting effects, Hegel believed that the modern 
determination of freedom necessarily entailed a market economy. As we have seen, the 
Philosophy of Right does not respond to this insight by claiming that modern states are 
necessarily strong enough to contain the disruptive force of a market economy. Hegel 
merely argues that a strong state is a necessary condition to achieve this end. Yet on the 
whole his analysis suggests a certain optimism as to the capacity of states actually to 
control the sphere of particular interests. Hegel could hold on to this view, it seems to 
me, because he believed that a modern state could – and should – take the form of a 
constitutional monarchy.33 In his view, only a monarch can actually stand above the 
parties and represent the interests of the society as a whole. Apparently assuming that 
modernity could achieve a synthesis of modern freedom and the rational core of 
premodern monarchies, Hegel did not consider the modern determination of freedom 
– that is to say, individual freedom – to entail democracy in the same way as it entailed 
a market economy. If we give up this assumption, as I think we must, then the relation 
between civil society and the state becomes more symmetrical – and hence more 
complicated – than the Philosophy of Right takes it to be.  
Seen from a contemporary point of view, it is clear that the modern determination 
of freedom necessarily entails the development of democratic forms of government.34 
Citizens who are successful in trading and gain economical power will at some point in 
time want to participate in politics as well. As a result, the sphere of politics itself has 
become a sphere within which struggles between particular interests are played out. 
Even when politicians aim to act on behalf of what they consider to be the common 
good, their fate largely depends on their capacity to satisfy the community of voters.35 
There seems to be no essential difference between gaining as many votes as possible 
and making as much profit as possible. Thus, the sphere of politics has come to 
reduplicate the struggle between the contrary determinations of freedom that Hegel 
33 PR, § 273, § 279. Hegel’s conception of the state does include a limited form of political representation of 
the so-called estates, a representation based on the election of deputies (cf. PR, §§ 308-309, §§ 311-314). See 
on this K. Westphal, ‘The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, in: F. Beiser (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993), 260-262. 
34 This is not to say that the development of capitalism and democracy have actually always gone hand in 
hand or must necessarily do so. But even though their emergence can be thwarted by all kind of factors, it 
seems to me that both capitalism and democracy are consequences of the determination of freedom 
constitutive of modernity as such. 
35 Evidently, democracy has in many cases been a most effective way of limiting the power of a small elite 
and, hence, of furthering the common good. Yet insofar as democracies are likely to put pressure on 
politicians to act in view of the short-time interests of voters and interest groups, democracy can as well be 
a way of thwarting the common good. 
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assigned to the sphere of civil society on the one hand and to the state on the other 
hand. Unlike Hegel, accordingly, we can no longer oppose the principle of self-interest 
that characterizes civil society to the principle of universal interest purportedly 
represented by the government. If modernity entails democracy, and if democracy 
tends to lack the force to limit the liberal determination of freedom to the sphere of civil 
society, then it might become increasingly difficult for modern societies to undo the 
entanglement of the spheres of politics and economy and, hence, to prevent the sphere 
of particular interests from destabilizing the society as a whole.  
As said, Hegel realized early on that the market economy such as it developed in 
his days at once allowed modern societies to flourish and threatened to undermine the 
mode of freedom represented by the state. The current crisis – reflected pre-eminently 
by the case of Greece – illustrates to which extent this threat has become a reality. The 
sphere of politics is weakened from within by ideological conflicts that are largely 
animated by the necessity to win elections. It is weakened as well by its increasing 
dependence on huge amounts of credit to stimulate the economy, prevent the financial 
system from collapsing, finance welfare programs that are becoming less and less 
sustainable and comply with a variety of short-term interests of voters and interest 
groups. The anonymous thing called ‘the markets’, in its turn, has gained power due to 
deregulation, the increased size of financial institutions, the globalization, increasing 
self-dependency and virtualization of the financial system, the capacity of this system to 
act immediately and the already mentioned debt accumulation by national, regional 
and local governments. As a result, the markets increasingly dictate national and 
international decision-making processes as well as the policies of intermediary, non-
democratic institutions such as IMF, EFSF and ECB. The precarious condition in 
which Greece, Spain and other countries find themselves today shows that the markets 
have come to exert the kind of power that used to be embodied by political institutions 
alone. The mode of freedom represented by the market – self-interest – thus threatens 
to posit itself as the unique principle of the society rather than as one of its necessary 
moments. 
I have tried to understand this development in a philosophical manner by, first, 
drawing on Hegel’s conception of the potential conflict between the spheres of civil 
society and the state and, second, by reinterpreting this conflict as a tragic conflict. This 
approach makes it possible to view the current events in light of a struggle between two 
complementary determinations of freedom of which one tends to gain the upper hand, 
even though this tendency is not necessary in the sense that the current state of affairs 
could have been predicted. The dynamic at stake does not preclude the possibility that 
particular political bodies at particular points in time succeed in controlling the 
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markets, whether by imposing strict regulations on financial transactions, balancing 
their budgets or in other ways. Yet even governments that achieve, at least to a certain 
extent, what all governments according to Hegel ought to achieve continue to be 
challenged by a force that seems ever harder to tame.   
If we step back even further from the current crisis, then the tragic conflict between 
two contrary determinations of freedom might be traced to the utterly precarious 
condition of modernity as such. The modern conception of individual freedom 
undoubtedly saved us from premodern forms of political tyranny and gave rise to 
unprecedented economic, moral, cultural and intellectual prosperity. Think of Oedipus 
who freed the Thebans from the Sphinx. Yet what if the simultaneous unfolding of the 
determinations that this modern conception of freedom entails – capitalism and 
democracy – is at once the source of the political, economic, and financial crises that 
we witness today? The destabilizing effects produced by the globalizing financial and 
economic systems call for ever stronger political institutions. Yet given the simultaneous 
development of democracy, the force of these political institutions tends to be weakened 
by internal struggles – both at a national and at an international level. In Greece and 
elsewhere, politicians fight one another, trying to satisfy the short-term interests of their 
voters, parties or countries rather than to save the community. Even the development 
of the modern principle of freedom might reach a point at which its destructive effects 
begin to prevail. If this is true, then democracy as we know it may be less and less 
capable of containing the dynamic driven by particular interests and hence of 
preventing the very distinction between civil society and politics from collapsing.36 
Modern societies that owe their life to the principle of individual freedom may well be 
threatened from within by the implications of this very principle. Think of the pollution 
that Oedipus turned out to have caused.  
One concrete example of this self-undermining dynamic is the effect of the euro. 
The single currency that allowed Greece and Europe to boom economically now 
threatens to destroy the very stability and wealth it was meant to produce. “It is this 
very luck that has destroyed you”, the Greeks – and not only the Greeks – may have to 
tell themselves. Similarly, whereas democracy saved contemporary Greece from 
36 In a certain way, this brings us back to the premodern lack of a clear-cut distinction between state and 
civil society or between public and particular interests, except for the fact that much of the power has 
moved from the political sphere to financial institutions and corporations. Because within modern 
democracies the sphere of politics has become increasingly affected by the principle of particular interests, 
the essential conflict between the political and the economic sphere threatens to become invisible. This 
conflict reemerges, however, whenever politicians attempt to speak and act in the name of all, an attempt 
that was preeminently symbolized by Obama’s speeches during his election campaign and the first phase of 
his presidency. It also reemerges in the dispersed and often inarticulate voices of people who all over the 
world are denouncing the incapacity of politics – whether democratic or not – to represent their interests.  
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political tyranny, it at the same time made Greek politics vulnerable to high levels of 
clientelism, corruption and public debt. At an empirical level, we can certainly blame 
particular circumstances, governments, politicians, advisors, voters, and investors for 
the current crisis. Yet seen from a philosophical point of view their actions reflect a 
dynamic that runs deeper. Oedipus cannot be blamed for killing his father and 
marrying his mother, in other words, for mistaking one side of the whole for the whole 
itself. Similarly, modernity cannot be blamed for having unleashed the principle of 
individual freedom, or, put more concretely, for having allowed capitalism and 
democracy to develop simultaneously and become ever more interdependent. Whereas 
Greece and the euro might be saved, there seems to be no escape from a world 
dominated by the struggle between particular interests, and this despite the many 
individuals and organizations that selflessly devote themselves to higher ends. All traces 
ultimately lead to a crucial element of modernity as such. 
Is there no way out? Alternatives such as classical communism or China’s non-
democratic embrace of capitalism seem to be out of the question because the ideal of 
democracy is too deeply ingrained in the modern world to be abandoned, even when 
actual democratic processes often seems to come down to fights driven by the short-
term interests of voters, financiers and lobbyists. Yet at the same time we see how 
European countries are letting themselves increasingly be governed by financial 
institutions erected to protect them against the spreading pollution of abysmal debts, 
which means that democracy as we know it, whether we like it or not, is already 
turning into something that shares features with China’s bureaucracy as well as with 
Hegel’s outline of a constitutional monarchy no less firmly entrenched in a bureaucratic 
administration.37 It is not up to philosophy to present solutions to the crisis to which the 
development of the modern determination of freedom seems to have led. All it can do 
is to try to reinterpret the meaning of modernity without negating its utter 
precariousness – just as Oedipus reinterpreted the meaning of his life just before leaving 
Thebes as a blind and destitute man.     
 
 
Institute of Philosophy 
University of Leuven 
Kardinaal Mercierplein 2 
3000 Leuven  
Belgium 
karin.deboer@hiw.kuleuven.be 
37 Cf. PR, §§ 287-289. 
                                                          
